Traditionally, the emergence of populist political extremism on both the left and the right has been ascribed to economic, social and political failures. Such groups appeal, it is argued, to the economically disaffected and socially marginalised. [1] Accounts of right-wing populism commonly reflect this thesis, with movements such as Le Pen's Front National in France and the German Republicans cited as examples. Such parties, which deliberately seek the support of the disaffected and marginalised, are not, however, confined to Western Europe. The former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe have not been immune to this phenomenon, as the emergence of parties such as the Slovak National Party in Slovakia, the Republicans in the Czech Republic, the Serbian Radical Party or the Hungarian Justice and Life Party demonstrate. With the rise of the Freedom Party in Austria, a prosperous and stable liberal democracy, the accepted account of the emergence of right-wing movements demands re-examination. This essay first identifies the characteristics of this "traditional populism" of the right and then sketches the contours of the "new populism," which has appeared in recent years with remarkable speed and success. It also assesses the likelihood of the emergence of such movements in Central and Eastern Europe and suggests the manner and means by which domestic institutions and external bodies, especially the European Union, might respond.
Traditional parties of the far right
The "traditional" parties of the far right, such as the Front National, display a number of common characteristics. The most obvious is, of course, their strong sense of national and linguistic identity, clearly manifested in their virulent xenophobia and openly racist rhetoric. Second, they share an ingrained distrust of parliamentary politics, instead favouring broadly authoritarian models of government, often with a single demogogic leader. Amongst the older generation, in particular, in states which have experienced an authoritarian government in the past, there is something of a nostalgic longing for a return to such a regime. Third, populists of the far right commonly advocate neo-corporatist economic policies, with extensive state intervention in the economy. This aspect of their programmes reflects, to a large extent, the socio-economically marginalised constituency, which forms the base of support for such parties. Finally, these groups tend to promote conservative social policies, including the prohibition of abortion and the limitation of access to birth control (on the grounds that birth-rates amongst the indigenous population are falling relative to those of immigrants), the reinforcement of the family, the eradication of drug abuse and the reform of what they perceive as excessively liberal school curricula.
What has perhaps best characterised these movements, however, is their palpable lack of major electoral success. In part, this failure has been a function of post-war European governments' commitment to marginalise such groups through their economic and social policies. The promotion of full employment, economic growth, consumerism and increased spending on social services were all, in part, intended to detract from the appeal of authoritarian groups. Greater European unity was also conceived of as a means of preventing the resurgence of the authoritarian extreme right, by guaranteeing these economic and social gains and by tying national governments into a broader framework of law to support democracy and human rights. The pursuit of these policies rested upon the long-standing belief that economic depression, social marginalisation and political weakness (combined with national humiliation in Germany's case) had been the determinant factors in the success of the "traditional" far right in the 1930s. Succinctly stated by E H Carr in 1940, Western leaders believed that: "the connexion between unemployment and war is not fortuitous. Seven million unemployed brought Hitler to power."[2]
Political democracy, it was argued, had to be extended by national governments as well as by supra-national bodies, such as the EU, into the social and economic spheres or face lasting illegitimacy in the eyes of a demanding, broadened electorate. These ideas have continued to dominate Western European thinking, forming much of the basis for the argument for rapid EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe. What is uncertain, however, is whether such policies can prevent the reappearance of strong far-right parties in both West and East.
The appeal of the new populist parties
Indeed, Europe is witnessing the formation and rapid growth of a new type of extreme right populist party which, so far at least, has experienced a greater degree of success than its "traditional" counterpart. Jörg Haider's Freedom Party (FPÖ), which obtained more than 27 percent of the votes in the Austrian parliamentary elections of October 1999 and entered into the governmental coalition, may be only the tip of a more substantial political iceberg. The existence and electoral appeal of the Italian Lega Nord, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the People's Party in Switzerland, the much smaller Savoy League of Patrick Abeille in French Savoy and perhaps even the rightist CSU, which has ruled the German Land of Bavaria since 1957, seem to illustrate a broader continental trend. Clearly, there are specific domestic conditions that have influenced the rise of these parties (starting with the Proporz in Austria), but they do appear to have a number of characteristics which distinguish them from the "traditional" movements of the extreme right.
First, in contrast to the "traditional" parties, whose constituencies are usually the economically and socially marginalised, the so-called "Alpine populists" - in Switzerland, Austria, Northern Italy and Savoy - deliberately appeal to the rich and the privileged. Their economic rhetoric is explicitly neo-liberal. The centralist state is denounced as bureaucratic and "tax-oppressive." Thus, the Lega Nord proclaims its fervent opposition to the "centralized, bankrupted, oppressive, perverse, profligate, high-tax system," and the "incorrigible inefficiency and corruption caused by Welfarism." It continues:
we have the Welfare State because it is in the interest of the whore-masters who (mis)manage it and because it benefits the parasites who hover around it, like so many viruses that suck the vital energy out of a nervous system (financial system), and not because it is for the material or moral well-being of the people.[3]
In less strident terms, the Austrian Freedom Party has pledged to cut taxes and subsidies, reduce the federal deficit and privatise state-owned companies. The first budget, presented by the new FPÖ finance minister Karl-Heinz Grasser on Tuesday 21 March, confirmed their neo-liberal economic orientation and reaffirmed their commitment to the policies outlined in their manifesto. The 'new' far right, therefore, has jettisoned the corporatism and interventionism of their 'traditional' cousins, embracing the market in an effort to reap the supposed economic benefits of globalisation. About the cultural and political aspects of this trend, however, they remain deeply suspicious.
Structural transformations in Western European economies have been matched by a change in the social groups to which the new far right appeals. The growth of high-technology and service industries has changed the face of these economies, bringing important political consequences. The appeal of traditional conservatism, for example, has been undermined by higher labour mobility and job insecurity. In response, some conservatives have toyed with nationalist or anti-immigration policies, attempting to co-opt far right opinion. The decline of the manufacturing industry has also eroded the constituency of the left. It was to this group, too, that the 'old' extreme right appealed. Its decline has required a tactical shift. 'Single-issue' politics, traditionally focused on anti-immigration, has been replaced by a broader agenda with a wider intended appeal. Today, as Lonnie Johnson has pointed out, the bedrock of the FPÖ support is still working class, but the party has also made considerable inroads among the young, the educated and with female voters.[4]
In so doing, the "new" far right has sought to present a respectable profile, at least on issues other than immigration, and hitherto has taken steps to affirm a commitment to the democratic process and its institutions. Haider and the FPÖ, for example, have been keen to present themselves as transcending the traditional political divisions, seeking to rid themselves of some of the stigma of the "traditional" far right. Haider considers himself "beyond left and right," which is the title of a book he published in 1997. He declared as early as 1975 that "the search for a third way is more urgent than ever"[5] and later repeated "We [in the Freedom Party] are neither right nor left, we're just in front." [6] The Lega Nord's programme also argues that the movement "must stay outside and above the meaningless Left-Right scheme, fighting for its well-defined goal, against all other parties if necessary, but at the same time trying to catalyze transversal support among them: the yearning for massive popular support driven by populistic slogans has to be put aside for a while, and the conduct must be subtler and more refined."[7]
This new "refinement" is reflected in the (at least nominal) commitment of the "new" far right to parliamentary politics and the democratic process. Whether this commitment is genuine is difficult to judge, given that such undertakings are constitutionally required in many European states, and participation in the political arena is barred to those who refuse to make them. [8] It may well be, however, that this commitment is a tacit recognition of democracy's continuing popular appeal, or perhaps even an indication of the willingness of a new generation of right-wingers to embrace it. Whether tactical or grounded in conviction, the democratic orientation of the new far right might well help to explain its appeal. Whilst democracy remains popular, mainstream political parties are often not. Western voters are, in general, apathetic about such politics and politicians, and consequently more prone to favour an alternative: the Greens in the 1980s, the "old" far right in the 1990s (in Belgium, for example) and the FPÖ in Austria in 2000. A commitment to the democratic process makes the parties of the "new" far right "safer" in the eyes of the electorate.
The transformation of the new "populists," both rhetorical and political, has been accelerated in the wake of Haider's electoral success in Austria, as the value of "respectability" is appreciated by similar groups across Western Europe. As the new far right eclipses the "traditionalists," Haider, rather than Le Pen, is increasingly viewed as the role model. The decision of Bruno Megret (the former Number Two of the Front National and the man usually considered to be the "moderate" and "respectable" face of the party) to secede and create the Mouvement National Républicain (MNR), could be tentatively seen as an illustration of the growing divide between these two approaches to far-right politics. Megret, for instance, recently declared: "what Haider has done in Austria, we will do in France." [9]
Positioning the party "beyond left and right,", and presenting this respectable image to the electorate has clearly served the FPÖ well. Since 1986, when Haider became Chairman, as the table below suggests, the Freedom Party has succeeded in attracting blue-collar voters traditionally supportive of Social Democracy.
How do Austrian blue-collar workers vote?
SPÖ |
ÖVP |
FPÖ |
Greens |
Libe-rals |
|
1986 |
57 |
26 |
10 |
4 |
|
1990 |
52 |
21 |
21 |
2 |
|
1994 |
47 |
15 |
29 |
4 |
2 |
1995 |
41 |
13 |
34 |
3 |
4 |
Change 1986-1995 |
-16 |
-13 |
+24 |
-1 |
+2 (1994-1994 change) |
[Source: F. Plasser, P.Ulram, E.Neuwirth, F.Sommer, "Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1995," quoted in Sully, The Haider Phenomenon, p 121.]
Significantly, in October last year, the Freedom Party overtook the Social Democrats (SPÖ) as the "workers' party," with 47% of workers voting for the FPÖ. Moreover, they came close to a highly symbolic victory over the SPÖ in the capital, a traditional stronghold of Austrian Social Democracy marked by the legacies of "Red Vienna."
In contrast to the "authoritarian" far right, with its outright rejection of European integration, the "new" populists of the right share an ambiguous attitude towards the EU and the European project. Although sceptical in many respects, these groups are cautiously supportive of some aspects of the project. Clearly opposed to a federal, centralised EU, their leaders have been at the forefront of demands for a "Europe of regions" or "of nations." The FPÖ, for example, firmly states that "the European Union shall not become a European federal state but a confederation." [10] Similarly, the Lega Nord seeks to build "the EU of the regions," a "Europe of the Hundred Flags," and contends that "the nation state is a historical artifact, functional in a given social and economic situation, which will soon become obsolete." Edmund Stoiber, the leader of the Bavarian CSU, a party notoriously hostile to a federal Europe, also recently repeated his opposition to a "European central state" (Zentralstaat).[11] Such views seem to reflect both the populists' above-mentioned dislike of bureaucracy and inefficiency, as well as the primarily "regional" rather than "national" appeal of the movements. The "new" far right has often built its success in regional strongholds: the Lega Nord in prosperous Lombardy, the Vlaams Blok in Flemish Flanders and the FPÖ in the Land of Carinthia.
Central Europe
The success of Haider's FPÖ in Austria raises the question of whether the "new" populism of the far right might gain similar electoral results in Central and Eastern Europe. Could a similar political phenomenon emerge in the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, and lead - to use a phrase out of context - to what the first president of Czechoslovakia, T G Masaryk, might have bemoaned as an unfortunate "re-Austrianisation" of the region? Furthermore, what might be the consequences of understanding the rise of the "new" far right, not in terms of economic or political crisis, but in terms of increasing prosperity and political stability, underpinned by EU membership?
Hints of a possible "Haiderisation" of Central Europe could be detected even before the recent electoral success of the Freedom Party. It might be argued that, for example, the readiness of Vaclav Klaus's Civic Democratic Party (ODS) to split the Czechoslovak state in 1992, on the grounds of ridding the Czechs of the Slovak "burden," is an illustration of this process. To a lesser, but still tangible, extent, the economic arguments presented to the comparatively wealthly Slovenes in favour of secession from Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s may also reflect this trend.
This view is reinforced by the manner in which some Western European populists have responded to the "velvet divorce" of Czechoslovakia, and the secession of Slovenia from the Yugoslav state.
Leaders of both the Vlaams Blok and the Lega Nord have praised the "Czechoslovak-style" separation. The 1995 electoral manifesto of Vlaams Blok unambiguously appealed to the Czechoslovak precedent· arguing that "the Belgian state is a historical mistake ...We want a separation and a division on the Czechoslovak model." [12] The authors of the pamphlet The Project of a Flemish State (Project Vlaamse Staat), published in May 1998, applauded the "quick, democratically legitimate" breakup of the Czechoslovak state. [13] In June 1996, the chairman of Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, declared: "it's time to choose the Czechoslovakian way... Let us divide up the country." [14] Almost eight years after the start of the break-up of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav federations, there is more evidence that could illustrate the potential resonance of the "new" far right in Central Europe. We shall briefly examine the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia.
The Czech Republic
Less than eight years after having engineered the breakup of Czechoslovakia, Klaus, now Chairman of the Czech National Assembly, sharply condemned the EU reaction to the inclusion of the FPÖ in the Austrian government.
|
For Klaus, the Freedom Party's participation is "the lesser evil compared with the attempt of the EU to oppose the sovereign decision-making of one of its members." [15] While he has sought to secure EU membership for the Czech Republic, Klaus has simultaneously expressed his disdain at what he perceives as the "socialist" or "Social-democratic" aspects of the European project. Like Bossi, Haider or even Stoiber, Klaus believes that "in the future, the EU will be formed by sovereign states which have joined voluntarily, and that the sovereignty of the EU itself will be derived from its members…we [the ODS] do not want to dissolve our state in supranational structures formed without deep roots in fact, and without real identity." The ODS is keen to see "a systematic curbing of the growth in [EU] bureaucracy" and argues for a Europe the "strength" of which is in "its diversity, not its uniformity." [16]
It is not only in their attitudes towards the European project, however, that there is common ground between Czech rightist politicians and Haider's FPÖ.
As the well-documented discrepancy between Klaus's rhetoric and the reality of the ODS's economic policies when the party was in power demonstrates, words and statements of intent are not necessarily a reflection of actions and beliefs. Yet even a superficial comparison of the political programmes of the FPÖ and the ODS illustrates the potential for the emergence of Haider-style populism in the Czech Republic.
From a semantic point of view, the ODS, like the Freedom Party, puts a neo-liberal notion of "freedom" at the centre of its political philosophy. Both parties acknowledge the role of the state in areas such as social solidarity and the protection of the environment, but they also consider the state a potential threat to the "freedom" of the individual. The ODS, thus, purports to "erect obstacles to the attempts to extend Etatisme…Neither intervention in the contents of contracts between individuals nor entrepreneurial activity is the business of the state."
The FPÖ proposes a "catalogue of duties for the state [which] should serve to limit the state to its original functions and should prevent an expansion in its activities, thus forming the basis for the necessary reduction of the state…The state should abstain from any profitable or entrepreneurial activity that currently just leads to a distortion of competitive relationships on the markets to the detriment of private competitors and …to the disadvantage of taxpayers."
Both parties share a strong sense of national identity. What sets them apart is the openly xenophobic rhetoric of the Austrian party. Given the conflicts between Czechs and Romanies, and the racist attitudes with which immigrants from poorer states to the East must content, the potential for a political movement combining the mainstream policies of the ODS with an anti-immigrant agenda is clear.
Hungary
This analysis can also be applied, in many respects, to Hungary. Like Klaus, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán refused to denounce the participation of the Freedom Party in the Austrian government. Instead, he rather enigmatically described the FPÖ's rise to power as "a stone being thrown into an intellectually and politically stagnant pond." [17] In Hungary, some inroads have been made by more "traditional" far-right politicians and Istvan Csurka, Chairman of the Justice (Truth) and Life Party, represented by only 14 out of 386 MPs, has still been able to "drag the Hungarian agenda further rightward." [18]
Mainstream parties, such as Orban's Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), have displayed a tendency to drift towards an increasingly nationalist agenda, while remaining committed to parliamentary politics and neo-liberal economics. On 23 March, for example, a representative of FIDESZ introduced in parliament a bill which would make compulsory the display of the national flag "on all public buildings at all times." According to another MP, the bill "aims at strengthening national awareness." [19] Moreover, the democratic commitment of FIDESZ's junior coalition partner, the Independent Smallholders' Party of Jozsef Torgyan, remains doubtful.
Some elements of FIDESZ are also increasingly critical of the EU, arguing that it represents a threat to Hungarian "values" and "interests." Hungarian doubts over membership focus largely on nationality questions. The fate of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia are still a thorny issue, as they were in 1993, when Hungary threatened to veto Slovakia's inclusion in the Council of Europe. Such questions might easily evolve into broader economically-grounded arguments, politically "respectable" but with a nationalistic edge, which could be used to justify a Hungarian veto against a possible second wave of Central European applicants (in the plausible scenario that Hungary gains membership before Romania or Slovakia).
Slovenia
Slovenia's political landscape is, at first sight, remarkably similar to Austria's, marked by a clear divide between mainstream Social Democratic and Catholic-conservative groupings. It is also marked by notable economic success, and Slovenia stands as one of the wealthiest countries of the region, with a 1997 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity of USD 13,000.[20]
Slovenia could witness the emergence of several right-wing movements which could follow the example of the FPÖ and establish themselves as "third forces" on the political landscape. For some time, the Slovene National Party seemed to be a possible contender, gaining, for instance, ten percent of the votes in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Support, however, dwindled and the party eventually split up in 1997.
The (misnamed) Slovene Social Democratic Party, and its leader Janez Jansa, are more likely candidates. Jansa, the former Minister of Defense between 1991 and 1994, has established himself as the charismatic figurehead of the movement, adopting the trappings of a modernised and "urban" radical right. Its policies are a potent mix of xenophobic rhetoric with claims to be "Social Democratic."
As Rudolf M Rizman contends, Jansa's "hatred and moreover vengeful spite against everything Yugoslav, communist and liberal Weltanschauung" gives the Social Democratic Party the ability to shake the Slovene party system and to mobilise along the lines of radical right and values - especially if, Rizman pointedly adds, "the change of the international situation (the substantial rise of the radical right elsewhere in Europe…) would allow for it." [21]
Slovakia
The Slovak National Party has long been considered a typical "traditional" far-right movement and the leadership of Jan Slota (incidentally, a "friend" of Le Pen's) was clearly marked by extremism.
But Slota's recent ousting, and his replacement by the more moderate Anna Malikova, may mark a shift from these "traditional" policies to those of the "new" far right, much as Megret's split from Le Pen suggests a movement towards the adoption of an FPÖ-like approach in France.
Implications: domestic and European
In a recent interview with the Financial Times, Romano Prodi, the Chairman of the European Commission, stated: "We must tranquilise our public opinion and the public opinion of the applicant countries. Otherwise, there will be hundreds of Austrian situations." [22] In this context, what can domestic and international institutions do to stem the tide of the "new" far right in Central Europe?
One major factor in the rise of parties of the radical right in Western Europe is the illegitimacy, in the eyes of the electorate, of mainstream political parties. In Austria, public disaffection with the conservative and Social Democratic movements which have dominated domestic politics since World War II contributed greatly to the popularity of Haider's "third force," the Freedom Party. In Central Europe, where the concept of a "party" itself remains discredited, tainted by its association with the Communist past, and disaffection with mainstream politicians is common, it is more difficult to assess the risk of growing support for the far right. Nevertheless, if Europe is seeing the rise of a new breed of extreme right-wingers, who appeal to the more affluent and politically-aware voter, it seems likely that such parties will emerge in Central Europe, as the economies of the region grow and entry into the EU is secured.
Domestically, the options available to governments to check the rise of such groups, especially those which seek to present a respectable, constitutional face, are limited. Seeking to exclude them from the democratic process may be unconstitutional; including them in government may incur the wrath of the EU or international opinion. Nevertheless, this latter tactic, which might be described as the "Schüssel option" [the choice of the leader of the Austrian conservative People's Party to ally himself with the FPÖ], though entailing a substantial risk, might well be the most profitable. It appears that much of the "new" far right's support comes by way of "protest votes." In government, given an already disaffected electorate, these groups might rapidly lose popular appeal, as their ability to cut bureaucracy or fight corruption is shown to be limited. This option does involve a risk, for it takes at face-value the democratic commitment of the "new" far right; in the long run, however, it may be the best tactic.
The implications for the European project, however, may be interpreted as more serious. Hitherto, enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe has at least been partially justified on the grounds of discouraging the establishment of nationalist authoritarian regimes in the region. Sharing the economic benefits of the EU, it is argued, prevents the creation of economically and socially marginalised groups which provide the most fertile recruiting grounds for far-right parties.
The growth of the "new" far right, represented by the FPÖ in Austria, with its emphasis on neo-liberal economics and professed commitment to democracy, could challenge this thesis. It may be, in fact, that the far right could emerge in strength in societies marked by relative wealth and social stability.
It is possible to foresee that, following the accession of their countries to the EU, with the economic benefits that it might bring, Czech, Hungarian or Slovene leaders may frustrate both greater integration of the Union and the process of admitting poorer neighbours to the East, such as Romania or Bulgaria.
Like Haider, a Czech, Hungarian or Slovene populist leader of the "new" far right could insist on greater economic convergence as a precondition to further enlargement, such as an equalisation of wage levels between EU states and prospective members or a so-called "transition period" for labour mobility. The distinct lack of enthusiasm (to put it euphemistically) of states, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, towards EU eastward enlargement might prefigure this. A slogan such as "once we get into the EU, we will close the door behind us" might therefore prove dangerously seductive to the electorates.
Animosities against a supra-national institution like the EU could be stirred up by Central European far-right leaders. All the leading applicant countries for EU membership (with, of course, the exception of Poland) are small states, which share the experience of forced participation in an oppressive Communist political structure which many regard as a foreign, ie Russian, import. Slovenia was, of course, not part of the Soviet Bloc, but the Slovene far right has consistently repudiated all things "Yugoslav" (and this includes the adoption of a xenophobic stance against the immigrants from the former Yugoslavia who have settled in the country).
The Haider case has been interpreted by far-right leaders in Central Europe as evidence that EU membership might be somewhat akin to membership in the Soviet Bloc (or Yugoslavia, for the Slovenes) and limit their sovereignty, as small and often newly-independent states. Anna Malikova, the new "moderate" leader of the Slovak National Party, recently made this fear explicit. "The reaction of Western Europe against Austria," she stated, "reminded me of the doctrine of limited sovereignty that we knew from 1968: The Russians then taught us that the choice of the electors could be put into question. We have just obtained our independence. We do not want to lose it again."[23]
To attempt, as the EU has done with Austria, to prevent the rise of the far right through the use of European institutions, might well provoke a nationalist backlash in newly-accepted EU states.
The dilemma for the EU, therefore, is that while eastward expansion may avert the adoption of "traditional" authoritarian extremist regimes, it may also increase the likelihood of the emergence of "new," nominally-democratic far-right parties with great electoral appeal. Expansion, therefore, is not the panacea some Europeans claim it to be. Attempts to avert the growth of the "new" far right by the EU after a first wave of enlargement may be met with considerable resistance in the new member states.
A shift to "qualified majority voting" in the EU, which Romano Prodi has recently declared imperative in the wake of the rise of the FPÖ, will undoubtedly increase rather than decrease tensions within the Union. [24] "The question," as the Polish Foreign Minister, Bronislaw Geremek, has argued, "is whether the future of the EU is to be built in an atmosphere of courage and imagination, or whether fear is to be the main emotion keeping the Union together." [25]
, 30 March 2000
Ian Hall read Modern History at Exeter College, Oxford, and holds a Mlitt in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews. He is currently writing a PhD on international political theory with special reference to the 'English school' of international relations theory. He is a book reviewer for International Affairs.
Magali Perrault is currently completing a doctoral dissertation on the breakup of Czechoslovakia at the University of St Andrews (Department of International Relations) and writes for Central Europe Review on Austrian, Czech and Slovak issues.
Moving on:
Notes [Click on the ^ to return to the text]
1. See C Williams, 'Problems of Transition and the Rise of the Radical Right,' in S P Ramet (ed), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State UP, 1999, p 32. ^
2. E H Carr, "The Two Scourges," The Times, 5 December 1940, p 5. ^
3. see http://www.leganord.org ^
4. See Lonnie Johnson, "On the Inside Looking Out: Austria's New ÖVP-FPÖ Government, Jörg Haider and Europe," Central Europe Review, vol 2, no 10, 13 March 2000. ^
5. quoted in Christa Zöchling, Haider: Licht und Schatten einer Karriere, Vienna, Molden Verlag, 1999, p 93. ^
6. quoted in Melanie Sully, The Haider Phenomenon, Boulder, East European Monographs, 1997, p 35. ^
8. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1999, p 292. ^
10. Programme of the Austrian Freedom Party adopted on 30 October 1997, see http://www.fpoe.at/englisch/Program.htm.^
11. Speech of Stoiber on 8 March 2000 in Passau (on the website of the CSU, http://www.csu.de).^
12. quoted in Wilfried Dewaechter, "Belgique: La déchirure," Politique Internationale, Winter 1997/98, no 78, p 180.^
13. See the interview with Gerolf Annemans, Luk Van Nieuwenhuysen and Karim Van Overmeire on the Vlaams Blok website http://www.vlaams-blok/project.html.^
14. quoted in John Newhouse, Europe Adrift, New York, Pantheon Books, p 69.^
15. RFE/RL Newsline, 4 February 2000.^
16. See the manifesto of the Civic Democratic Party (http://www.ods.cz). ^
17. Quoted in The Economist, 12 February 2000, p 36.^
18. Adam LeBor, "Haider Effect Spreads Beyond Austria to Silence Popular Voice of Liberal Youth," The Independent, 7 March 2000.^
20. Figures in report of the European Commission, Agenda 2000 enlargement (1998).^
21. Rudolf M.Rizman, "Radical Right Politics in Slovenia," in Ramet (ed), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989, p 155.^
22. Romano Prodi, quoted in "Prodi Signals Hard Line on EU Applicants," Financial Times, 3 March 2000.^
23. quoted in Adrien Jaulmes, "Les nationalistes slovaques en embuscade," Le Figaro, 18 February 2000.^
24. See "Prodi Signals Hard Line on EU Applicants," Financial Times, 3 March 2000.^
25. Bronislaw Geremek quoted in "Prodi Scolded on EU Expansion," Financial Times, 7 March 2000.^
