They are here, the future common enemy, helmeted and uniformed, shielded in their APCs and brandishing rifles and machine guns. The common enemy to be is KFOR and, by implication, NATO. It is flanked by Serbs triumphantly invited to repossess the now defunct security zone (one is tempted to ask "so, what was this idiotic war all about?"). Besieged by the radicalized remnants of the KLA and by a disdainful Macedonian populace—these less than elite units constitute prime targets. In "NATO's Next War"—an article published on 14 June 1999—I wrote this:
The real, protracted war is about to begin: NATO and the international peacekeeping force against an unholy—and, until recently, improbable—alliance. Milošević (or post-Milošević Serbia) and the KLA against the occupying forces. It is going to be ferocious. It is going to be bloody. And it is going to be a Somali nightmare.
Serbia... wants to regain its lost sovereignty over at least the northern part of Kosovo. Because it virulently hates, wholeheartedly detests, voluptuously despises NATO, the "Nazi aggressor" of yestermonth. Serbia has no natural allies left, not even Russia which prostituted its geopolitical favours for substantial IMF funding. Its only remaining natural ally is the KLA.
The KLA stands to lose everything as a result of the latest bout of peacemaking. It is supposed to be "decommissioned"—IRA-style, disarmed ("demilitarized" in the diplomatic argot) and effectively disbanded.
The KLA's political clout rested on its ever-growing arsenal and body of volunteers. Yet volunteers have a strange habit of going back whence they came once a conflict is over. And the weapons are to be surrendered. Devoid of these two pillars of political might—KLA political leader Hashim Thaçi may find himself unemployed, a former self-declared Prime Minister of a shadow government in Albanian exile. Rugova has the coffers, filled to the brim with tens of millions of US dollars and German marks raised from the Albanian diaspora world-wide. Money talks, KLA walks Bad for the KLA.
Having tasted power... Thaçi is not likely to compromise on a second rate appointment in a Rugova-led administration.Hence, the mysteriously emergent Albanian "National Army of Liberation" on Macedonia's border with Kosovo. In another article, "The Army of Liberation," published on 5 June 2000, I described the dynamics that fostered the current anti-Macedonian insurgency. The KLA is trying to revive its sagging fortunes by provoking a new regional crisis—this time in the western part of pliable Macedonia and in collaboration with Albanians inside Macedonia. It is all about power, smuggling routes, the drug trade and the huge infusions of Western aid—a gang warfare compounded by years of mistreatment and mutual animosity. I wrote:
...both nations [Serbia and Albania] came up with grandiose game plans: Milošević's "Greater Serbia" and the KLA's "Greater Albania." The idea, in both cases, was to create an ethnically homogeneous state by shifting existing borders, incorporating hitherto excluded parts of the nation and excluding hitherto included minorities...
...The possession of weapons and self-government have always been emblematic of the anticipated statehood of Kosovo. Being disarmed and deprived of self-governance was, to the Albanians, a humiliating and enraging experience, evocative of earlier Serb-inflicted injuries...
This quandary is a typically anodyne European compromise which is bound to ferment into atrabilious discourse and worse. The Kosovars—understandably—will never accept Serb sovereignty or even Serb propinquity willingly...It is, therefore, inconceivable that the KLA has disbanded and disarmed or transformed itself into the ill-conceived and ill-defined "Kosovo Protection Corps"... in all likelihood, the KLA still maintains clandestine arms depots (intermittently raided by KFOR), strewn throughout Kosovo and beyond.
Its chain of command, organizational structure, directorates, operational and assembly zones and general staff are all viable. I have no doubt—though little proof—that it still trains and prepares for war...
...The emergence of the "Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac" (all towns beyond Kosovo's borders, in Serbia, but with an Albanian majority) is a harbinger. Its soldiers even wear badges in the red, black and yellow KLA colours.
The enemies are numerous: the Serbs (should Kosovo ever be returned to them), NATO and KFOR (should they be charged with the task of reintegrating Serbia), perhaps more moderate Albanians with lesser national zeal or Serb-collaborators... Moreover, the very borders of Kosovo are in dispute....The war is far from over.
And, about the KLA's dwindling options:
If it does not transform itself into a political organization in a convincing manner, it might lose its members to the more alluring pastures of statecraft... Overruled by UNMIK (United Nations Mission In Kosovo), opposed by Berisha's Democratic Party, recognized only by Albania and the main Albanian party in Macedonia and bereft of finances, it was unable to imbue its structure with content and provide the public goods a government is all about.
... The ballot box seems now to be the KLA's only exit strategy. The risk is that electoral loss will lead to alienation and thuggery if not to outright criminality. It is a fine balancing act between the virtuous ideals of democracy and the harsh constraints of realpolitik.
